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Properties such as provable security and correctness for randomized programs are naturally expressed relationally as approximate equivalences. As a result, a number of relational program logics have been developed to reason about such approximate equivalences of probabilistic programs. However, existing approximate relational logics are mostly restricted to first-order programs without general state. In this paper we develop Approxis, a higher-order approximate relational separation logic for reasoning about approximate equivalence of programs written in an expressive ML-like language with discrete probabilistic sampling, higher-order functions, and higher-order state. The Approxis logic recasts the concept of error credits in the relational setting to reason about relational approximation, which allows for expressive notions of modularity and composition, a range of new approximate relational rules, and an internalization of a standard limiting argument for showing exact probabilistic equivalences by approximation. We also use Approxis to develop a logical relation model that quantifies over error credits, which can be used to prove exact contextual equivalence. We demonstrate the flexibility of our approach on a range of examples, including the PRP/PRF switching lemma, IND$-CPA security of an encryption scheme, and a collection of rejection samplers. All of the results have been mechanized in the Coq proof assistant and the Iris separation logic framework. 

Parfait is a framework for proving that an implementation of a hardware security module (HSM) leaks nothing more than what is mandated by an application specification. Parfait proofs cover the software and the hardware of an HSM, which catches bugs above the cycle-level digital circuit abstraction, including timing side channels. Parfait's contribution is a scalable approach to proving security and non-leakage by using intermediate levels of abstraction and relating them with transitive information-preserving refinement. This enables Parfait to use different techniques to verify the implementation at different levels of abstraction, reuse existing verified components such as CompCert, and automate parts of the proof, while still providing end-to-end guarantees. We use Parfait to verify four HSMs, including an ECDSA certificate-signing HSM and a password-hashing HSM, on top of the OpenTitan Ibex and PicoRV32 processors. Parfait provides strong guarantees for these HSMs: for instance, it proves that the ECDSA-on-Ibex HSM implementation---2,300 lines of code and 13,500 lines of Verilog---leaks nothing more than what is allowed by a 40-line specification of its behavior. 

Almost-sure termination is an important correctness property for probabilistic programs, and a number of program logics have been developed for establishing it. However, these logics have mostly been developed for first-order programs written in languages with specific syntactic patterns for looping. In this paper, we consider almost-sure termination for higher-order probabilistic programs with general references. This combination of features allows for recursion and looping to be encoded through a variety of patterns. Therefore, rather than developing proof rules for reasoning about particular recursion patterns, we instead propose an approach based on proving refinement between a higher-order program and a simpler probabilistic model, in such a way that the refinement preserves termination behavior. By proving a refinement, almost-sure termination behavior of the program can then be established by analyzing the simpler model. We present this approach in the form of Caliper, a higher-order separation logic for proving termination-preserving refinements. Caliper uses probabilistic couplings to carry out relational reasoning between a program and a model. To handle the range of recursion patterns found in higher-order programs, Caliper uses guarded recursion, in particular the principle of Löb induction. A technical novelty is that Caliper does not require the use of transfinite step indexing or other technical restrictions found in prior work on guarded recursion for termination-preservation refinement. We demonstrate the flexibility of this approach by proving almost-sure termination of several examples, including first-order loop constructs, a random list generator, treaps, and a sampler for Galton-Watson trees that uses higher-order store. All the results have been mechanized in the Coq proof assistant. 

Probabilistic programs often trade accuracy for efficiency, and thus may, with a small probability, return an incorrect result. It is important to obtain precise bounds for the probability of these errors, but existing verification approaches have limitations that lead to error probability bounds that are excessively coarse, or only apply to first-order programs. In this paper we present Eris, a higher-order separation logic for proving error probability bounds for probabilistic programs written in an expressive higher-order language. Our key novelty is the introduction of error credits, a separation logic resource that tracks an upper bound on the probability that a program returns an erroneous result. By representing error bounds as a resource, we recover the benefits of separation logic, including compositionality, modularity, and dependency between errors and program terms, allowing for more precise specifications. Moreover, we enable novel reasoning principles such as expectation-preserving error composition, amortized error reasoning, and error induction. We illustrate the advantages of our approach by proving amortized error bounds on a range of examples, including collision probabilities in hash functions, which allow us to write more modular specifications for data structures that use them as clients. We also use our logic to prove correctness and almost-sure termination of rejection sampling algorithms. All of our results have been mechanized in the Coq proof assistant using the Iris separation logic framework and the Coquelicot real analysis library. 

Probabilistic couplings are the foundation for many probabilistic relational program logics and arise when relating random sampling statements across two programs. In relational program logics, this manifests as dedicated coupling rules that, e.g., say we may reason as if two sampling statements return the same value. However, this approach fundamentally requires aligning or synchronizing the sampling statements of the two programs which is not always possible. In this paper, we develop Clutch, a higher-order probabilistic relational separation logic that addresses this issue by supporting asynchronous probabilistic couplings. We use Clutch to develop a logical step-indexed logical relation to reason about contextual refinement and equivalence of higher-order programs written in a rich language with a probabilistic choice operator, higher-order local state, and impredicative polymorphism. Finally, we demonstrate our approach on a number of case studies. All the results that appear in the paper have been formalized in the Coq proof assistant using the Coquelicot library and the Iris separation logic framework. 

K2 is a new architecture and verification approach for hardware security modules (HSMs). The K2 architecture's rigid separation between I/O, storage, and computation over secret state enables modular proofs and allows for software development and verification independent of hardware development and verification while still providing correctness and security guarantees about the composed system. For a key step of verification, K2 introduces a new tool called Chroniton that automatically proves timing properties of software running on a particular hardware implementation, ensuring the lack of timing side channels at a cycle-accurate level. 

Grove is a concurrent separation logic library for verifying distributed systems. Grove is the first to handle time-based leases, including their interaction with reconfiguration, crash recovery, thread-level concurrency, and unreliable networks. This paper uses Grove to verify several distributed system components written in Go, including GroveKV, a realistic distributed multi-threaded key-value store. GroveKV supports reconfiguration, primary/backup replication, and crash recovery, and uses leases to execute read-only requests on any replica. GroveKV achieves high performance (67-73% of Redis on a single core), scales with more cores and more backup replicas (achieving about 2× the throughput when going from 1 to 3 servers), and can safely execute reads while reconfiguring. 

This paper presents ProbCompCert, a compiler for a subset of the Stan probabilistic programming language (PPL), in which several key compiler passes have been formally verified using the Coq proof assistant. Because of the probabilistic nature of PPLs, bugs in their compilers can be difficult to detect and fix, making verification an interesting possibility. However, proving correctness of PPL compilation requires new techniques because certain transformations performed by compilers for PPLs are quite different from other kinds of languages. This paper describes techniques for verifying such transformations and their application in ProbCompCert. In the course of verifying ProbCompCert, we found an error in the Stan language reference manual related to the semantics and implementation of a key language construct.